Strategic
Autonomy and the Indo-Pacific
India and
the United States have strengthened their strategic relationship in recent
years, particularly through platforms like the QUAD. While QUAD is officially a
non-military alliance focused on shared values and cooperation in areas like
maritime security and supply chain resilience, its regular military exercises
signal an underlying intention to build security coordination in the
Indo-Pacific. This alignment is largely driven by a shared concern over China’s
increasing assertiveness in the region.
However,
even as their interests converge, India has made it clear: it will not act as a
junior partner to the U.S. in a larger geopolitical confrontation with China.
India believes in strategic autonomy—it will partner with like-minded nations
but not at the cost of its long-term interests.
India’s
Two-Front Challenge: China and Pakistan
China poses
a strategic challenge to India, not just because of historical border disputes,
but due to its broader strategy of encircling India—militarily, diplomatically,
and economically. From the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) running
through Indian territory in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to expanding influence in
Sri Lanka, Maldives, and now Bangladesh, China aims to restrict India’s space
in its own neighbourhood.
India is
also wary of the U.S. taking an overwhelming military role in South Asia.
Replacing one hegemonic power with another does not serve India’s vision of a multipolar
Asia. India wants a balance of power—not domination by either China or the
United States.
The Indo-Pakistan
conflict of 2025 highlights this dilemma. China outwardly extended a hand of
peace by resolving some border tensions with India, but simultaneously equipped
Pakistan with high-end military technology and encouraged terrorist
provocations—clearly hoping to drag India into a full-scale war.
Had India
not responded, it would have looked weak and unable to defend its sovereignty.
If it had overreacted, it risked being drawn into a prolonged, destabilizing
war. India chose a third path—a swift, precise, and well-calibrated military
response. This forced Pakistan to seek a ceasefire, exposed the limitations of
Chinese-supplied weaponry, and showcased India's growing defence capabilities.
U.S.
Mixed Signals: A Trust Deficit
During the
conflict, India expected at least diplomatic support from the United States, if
not more. Instead, at the height of India’s anti-terror operations, the IMF—heavily
influenced by Washington—approved a critical loan to Pakistan, a move that
undermined Indian efforts and sent the wrong signal.
Furthermore,
the U.S. has continued to support Pakistan militarily. In 2022, the Biden
administration approved a $450 million package for maintenance of Pakistan’s
F-16 fighter jets. In 2025, the Trump administration approved an additional $397
million. These moves reflect America’s desire to keep leverage over Islamabad,
but they come at the cost of frustrating India—a democratic partner genuinely
committed to regional stability.
This dual
policy—expecting India to confront China while continuing to arm and fund
Pakistan—is seen in India as hypocritical and short-sighted.
Bangladesh:
A Missed Opportunity for Collaboration
Bangladesh
under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina maintained a stable and friendly
relationship with India. India provided military and intelligence support to
Bangladesh, and both countries worked together to curb extremism. However, the
political shift that brought Muhammad Yunus to power—widely perceived as
pro-U.S.—has destabilized this equation.
The U.S. wanted
influence over St. Martin’s Island, a strategic location near the Bay of
Bengal. While this may have helped contain China, the manner in which it was
done—without meaningful consultation with India—allowed China to seize the
opportunity and improve relations with the new regime.
As a result,
anti-India and anti-Hindu sentiments resurfaced in Bangladesh, aided by
extremist elements with links to Pakistan. Had the U.S. taken India into
confidence and coordinated this strategic foothold, the same objective could
have been achieved without destabilizing a close Indian ally. India was never
against the U.S. having strategic depth in the region—but it values mutual
respect and collaboration.
Stability
over Hegemony: India's Vision for the Subcontinent
Unlike both
China and the United States, India does not believe in creating instability
abroad to protect itself at home. India’s foreign policy is rooted in the idea
of peaceful development and regional harmony. It has never taken actions that
directly threaten U.S. interests and, in fact, has stood as a reliable partner
in global forums and multilateral platforms.
Ironically, U.S.
policies in South Asia often end up strengthening China’s position, not
weakening it. By failing to stand firmly with India during critical moments,
and by continuing to hedge its bets with Pakistan, the U.S. unintentionally
enables China’s goal of keeping the region fractured and unstable.
America also
seems to believe that Pakistan will support it in the event of a U.S.-China
confrontation over Taiwan. That’s highly unlikely. Pakistan has never
prioritized ideological alignment over strategic benefit, and its alignment
with China is far deeper than Washington acknowledges. The only hope for a
future where Pakistan supports regional peace is if India-Pakistan relations
normalize and proxy wars end—a vision India supports, but China and,
inadvertently, the U.S. keep obstructing.
India’s
Defense Policy: Self-Reliance with Partnership
India is
open to defense partnerships, including with the United States. However, it
does not wish to sacrifice national development for military purchases. India
has long desired technology transfer agreements that would allow it to build
and innovate domestically, rather than remain a buyer of expensive foreign
arms.
For
instance, India requested jet engine to develop its indigenous fighter
aircraft. The U.S. declined to supply it. As a result, India turned to Russia
and then developed its own fighter jet engine—a technological leap that could
have been a joint success story with the U.S. India has also now developed
fighter jet as well as dry engines for stealth drones and several other
high-tech platforms, proving its capability.
The problem
is not a lack of cooperation from India. It is the perception in Washington
that India is merely a market, not a partner. This outdated thinking needs to
change.
India and
the U.S.: Natural Allies, But On Equal Terms
The U.S. is
a global superpower. India respects that. But India is not in competition for
that status. India’s aim is to become a strong, self-reliant nation that plays
a stabilizing role in Asia. The U.S. should recognize that India is not a
transactional ally—it is a long-term strategic partner.
India is the
only power in Asia that can counterbalance China militarily, economically, and
diplomatically. And unlike China, India is a democracy, governed by rule of
law, respecting freedoms, and believing in multilateralism.
Both the
U.S. and India are the largest and most powerful democracies in the world. This
makes them natural allies. But for this partnership to flourish, there must be
mutual trust, respect, and equality—not expectations of subservience or
opportunism.
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